Impact |
OpenSSL fatal error may not be handled correctly. |
Attack Vector |
remote |
CVS base score |
5.9 Medium
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
Description |
The OpenSSL error state works for explicit handshake functions
(SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work
correctly if SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, the handshake
can fail, but data is passed without being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS
record layer. |
Detail |
OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an
"error state" mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake,
then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if you attempted to
continue the handshake. This works as designed for the explicit handshake functions
(SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work
correctly if SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the
handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function call. If
SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application for the same SSL object
then it will succeed and the data is passed without being decrypted/encrypted directly from
the SSL/TLS record layer. In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be
present that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having already
received a fatal error. OpenSSL version 1.0.2b-1.0.2m are affected. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2n.
OpenSSL 1.1.0 is not affected. |